트럼프의 본질"그에게 동맹과 北인권은 중요치 않아"

트럼프-김정은 회담이 사흘 앞으로 다가왔다. 한국의 보수 시민들이 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령에게 거는 기대는 아직도 크다. 그가 인류의 보편적 가치와, 동맹을 위해 무언가 해줄 것이라는 바램이다.

과연 트럼프는 그런 기대를 걸어볼만한 인물인가? 미국 WSJ(월스트리트 저널)이 트럼프의 본질을 분석했다.

WSJ은 9일 사설을 통해 "북한과의 협상에서 트럼프식 거래는 오직 미국만을 안전하게 할 것"이라고 전했다. (The art of a bad deal with North Korea would remove only America from harm's way).

신문은 먼저, 많은 사람들이 생각하는 것처럼 트럼프가 어떤 결실을 중시하며 협상에 열정을 갇는 타입이 아니라고 지적했다. 그러면서 지난 20년간의 커리어에서 트럼프는 그런 사람이 아니었음을 거론했다. (He perhaps is not the results-oriented craver of any kind of agreement for its own sake that many suspect. Mr. Trump has not been a results guy in his career for 20 years.)

WSJ은 트럼프가 행동을 하는 이유는 자신이 늘 화제의 중심에 있기 위해, 스포트라이트를 받는데에 있어서 자신을 앞지르는 이가 없도록 하기 위해서라고 설명했다. (He requires action for its own sake, to keep himself the center of attention, to make sure nobody outbids him for the spotlight)

신문은 "트럼프는 미북회담을 앞두고 벌써 12주간이나 쇼타임을 가졌다"며 "케이블 TV 방송들이 노벨상 후보라며 떠드는 것은 그에게, 미래의 실제 수상 가능성을 뛰어넘는 즉각적인 희열을 안겼다"고 전했다. (A burble on cable TV about his winning the Nobel Peace Prize was immediate gratification that outweighs even the somewhat conceivable prospect of a real prize down the road.)

WSJ은 트럼프가, 미국은 원한다면 늘 갑의 입장에 설 수 있다는 사실을 매우 잘 이해하고 있다고 말했다. (Mr. Trump, for all his faults, has understood better than his predecessors that the U.S. can be in the strong position if it wants to be.) 그러면서 그가 '윗사람의 자세'(imperiously)로 회담을 취소했다가 (북한의 간청으로) 회담이 다시 재개된 것이기에 매우 만족스러운 입장에 있다고 전했다.

그런 차원에서 트럼프 입장에서는 현재 모든 옵션이 괜찮은 상황(upside)이라고 설명했다. 딜을 해도 되고 안해도 되고, 회담을 해도 되고 안해도 된다는 것이다.

WSJ은 트럼프가 북한과의 협상에서 정확히 무엇을 원하는지는 확실치 않지만 아마도 '트럼프 자신에게 이로운 무엇'이 될 것이라고 전했다. (something that would be good for Donald Trump).

그러면서 신문은 그의 트레이드마크이자, 지지의 기반인 '미국우선주의' 입장에선 미국만 북한의 핵 위협에서 벗어나면 된다고 설명했다. 트럼프는 현실적으로 어려운 핵 완전 제거보다는, 장거리 미사일만을 확실히 폐기하는 거래를 하는데에 아무런 거리낌이 없을 것이라는 설명이다. (From an America First perspective, what’s more, Mr. Trump might have no trouble selling himself and his supporters a deal that left the North in possession of nuclear weapons but got rid of its long-range ballistic missile program, to put the U.S. outside the range of the North’s nukes.)  

신문은 한국과 일본이 트럼프의 위와 같은 거래를 배신으로 생각할 것이라고 말했다. (Japan and South Korea would rightly regard such a deal as a sell-out.) 그리고 인권운동가들과 미국의 전통적인 외교가에서도 그렇게 느낄 것이라고 밝혔다.

그러나 신문은 트럼프의 지지자들은 트럼프가 북한 문제에 집착하거나 동맹의 안전을 우위에 놓으라고 그를 당선시킨 것이 아니라고 강조했다.

신문은 위와 같은 거래가 북한이 야기하는 모든 문제들을 해결하진 않는다고 전했다.

하지만 그것은 트럼프를 (지지자들이 좋아하는) 대놓고 미국의 이익을 최우선으로 살피는 사람으로 비춰지게 할 것이라고 전했다. 

김민찬 기자 mkim@pennmike.com

다음은 WSJ 전문:

<With North Korea, What’s in It for Donald?>

The art of a bad deal with North Korea would remove only America from harm’s way.

None of us know how North Korea’s Kim Jong Un really sees his situation, but the question is absorbing in light of his apparent panic to resurrect Tuesday’s Kim-Trump summit. Mr. Kim already has adequate deterrent in his ability to blanket nearby Seoul with conventional high-explosive and chemical artillery shells. Threatening the U.S. with long-range nuclear missiles is not necessary to assure his security, only for other purposes.

Rising prosperity and growing international exchange, likely North Korean goals at Tuesday’s summit, would not be all upside for the regime. Direct traffic between the two Koreas is especially risky. But the status quo is also risky for Mr. Kim.

He’s master of a miserably backward country, overseen by a regime that deserves to be reviled by its people. His economy is desperately dependent on a life-support machine operated by unsympathetic people in Beijing. Pyongyang has a special problem in the infinitely superior development of its sister nation, South Korea. If the South surrendered to the North tomorrow, in two weeks it would end up running the place purely due to its superior productivity and world-class technical and cultural know-how.

He wants to live to be 95, large and in charge. Mr. Kim’s big geopolitical concern is not, and never has been, the U.S. It’s China. If China ever gets tired of his regime’s existence, the lights go out in Pyongyang overnight. His nuclear threats spoken and unspoken, including the threat to traffic in atomic material to other regimes or terrorists, are likely in some sense aimed at getting the U.S. to solve this problem for him.

A deal, for all these reasons, is plausible and might satisfy Mr. Trump. Mr. Kim would restrict himself to short-range theater nukes in return for a U.S. peace treaty and a reduction in the incessant U.S. and South Korean military exercises that are such a costly burden to the North. What Mr. Kim really wants is something more: In effect, he wants the U.S. to become an undeclared patron and investor in the longevity of his regime. He wants (as Vladimir Putin secretly does) to become an undeclared client whose survival the U.S. prefers for reasons of geopolitical stability and to constrain Beijing.

Which brings us to Donald Trump. He perhaps is not the results-oriented craver of any kind of agreement for its own sake that many suspect. Mr. Trump has not been a results guy in his career for 20 years. He requires action for its own sake, to keep himself the center of attention, to make sure nobody outbids him for the spotlight.

He has already gotten 12 weeks of showtime out of the prospect of a North Korea summit. A burble on cable TV about his winning the Nobel Peace Prize was immediate gratification that outweighs even the somewhat conceivable prospect of a real prize down the road.

Imperiously declining in late May to meet with Mr. Kim while even then throwing out all kinds of come-ons gave Mr. Trump a perfectly good week on Korea from his standpoint.

If Mr. Kim wants anything, he will have to come up with an offer knowing that dismissing it with a flourish is as useful to Mr. Trump as embracing it with a flourish. Mr. Trump, for all his faults, has understood better than his predecessors that the U.S. can be in the strong position if it wants to be. His predecessors made themselves supplicants to the Kim family, much as the Obama administration made itself a supplicant to Iran. They put themselves in the position of begging an adversary not to take steps that would require the U.S. to carry out its threats.

That doesn’t mean Mr. Trump has all the cards. But Mr. Kim perhaps understands that it’s all upside for Mr. Trump. Deal. No Deal. Summit. No Summit. From an America First perspective, what’s more, Mr. Trump might have no trouble selling himself and his supporters a deal that left the North in possession of nuclear weapons but got rid of its long-range ballistic missile program, to put the U.S. outside the range of the North’s nukes.

Nowhere in the “The Art of the Deal” does the author specify what Donald Trump would want in a negotiation with North Korea, but presumably the answer is “something that would be good for Donald Trump.”

Japan and South Korea would rightly regard such a deal as a sell-out. So would human-rights campaigners and probably the entirety of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. But Mr. Trump’s supporters did not elect him to obsess about North Korea or to put Japan’s security interests first. Such a deal would not solve every problem arising from North Korea’s possession of a nuclear program. But it would allow Mr. Trump to be seen looking conspicuously after America’s interests first.